Abstract-In this paper, we consider approaches for detecting integrity attacks carried out by intelligent and resourceful adversaries in control systems. Passive detection techniques are often incorporated to identify malicious behavior. Here, the defender utilizes finely-tuned algorithms to process information and make a binary decision, whether the system is healthy or under attack. We demonstrate that passive detection can be ineffective against adversaries with model knowledge and access to a set of input/output channels. We then propose active detection as a tool to detect attacks. In active detection, the defender leverages degrees of freedom he has in the system to detect the adversary. Specifically, the defender will introduce a physical secret kept hidden from the adversary, which can be utilized to authenticate the dynamics. In this regard, we carefully review two approaches for active detection: physical watermarking at the control input, and a moving target approach for generating system dynamics. We examine practical considerations for implementing these technologies and discuss future research directions.
I. INTRODUCTION Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs), engineered systems which apply computing, communication, and control in physical spaces, continue to evolve. CPSs involve devices with widespread sensing, networking, and processing functionalities and are used in applications that require safety, efficiency, and reliability including manufacturing, water distribution, waste management, health care, and the smart grid.
Ensuring security is a major challenge in CPSs. Our interest lies in detecting integrity attacks, where malicious agents inject inputs at sensors and actuators that drive the dynamics of the system towards undesired paths. Passive detection techniques, where the defender leverages finelytuned algorithms to make a decision about the health of the system, can be ineffective against intelligent adversaries. As such, we consider active detection, where the defender alters the CPS to reveal otherwise stealthy attacks. We discuss two approaches for active detection and system authentication: physical watermarking at the control input, and a moving target approach for generating system dynamics.
Authentication enables the defender to verify the identity of components and the system as a whole. In CPSs, this operation has to be performed not only in the cyber realm, but also within the framework of the physical dynamics. Indeed, cryptographic tools are often vulnerable to attacks and the extra security dimension in the physical dynamics plays a crucial role in reinforcing security. Physical watermarking and the moving target allow for this extra dimension.
In watermarking a known noisy input, or watermark, is injected into the CPS. It is expected that the effect of this input can be found in the measurement of the true output, due to the dynamics. If an attacker is unaware of the watermark, (s)he cannot adequately emulate the system dynamics. Thus, the watermark acts as a cyber-physical nonce, forcing an attacker to generate outputs unique to the given inputs at a chosen time. In the moving target approach, we aim to address cases where physical watermarking can not provide sufficient security such as when the defender's inputs are compromised or when the adversary leverages model knowledge to inject stealthy attacks. In our first proposal, we introduce extraneous states correlated to the ordinary states of the system. The time varying uncertain dynamics of the extra states can reveal integrity attacks affecting the normal states. As an alternative moving target approach, we examine the formulation of the system dynamics as a hybrid control system that transitions across multiple modes. We conclude by discussing application related challenges for these methods and identifying necessary future directions.
Our research on active detection is motivated significantly by recent research. In particular, previous work investigated stealthy attack scenarios such as zero dynamics attacks [1] [2] [3] , false data injection attacks [4] , [5] , covert attacks [6] , and replay attacks [7] . Alternative active detection methods have also been investigated. Specifically, [8] examines a one time change in the system matrices, [9] investigates coding sensor outputs, and [10] attempts to design controllers which prevent system identification from the attacker's perspective. When compared to the moving target [11] , each approach suffers from some drawbacks. In particular, a one time change in parameters [8] neglects system identification capabilities from an attacker, coding outputs does not account for physical attacks on sensors [9] , and changing a controller degrades performance [10] .
II. MODELING A. System Model
We assume that our system is modeled as a discrete time linear time invariant (LTI) control system as follows:
Here, x k ∈ R n is the state vector, u k ∈ R p is the set of control inputs implemented, and y k ∈ R m is a collection of sensor measurements, all at time k. In addition, w k ∼ N (0, Q) is independent and identically distributed (IID) process noise and v k ∼ N (0, R) is IID measurement noise. We assume that (A, C) is detectable. Moreover, (A, B) and (A, Q 1 2 ) are assumed to be stabilizable. While the above model is relatively simple, the methods to be presented can, in many cases, be applied to realistic nonlinear systems.
A Kalman filter is used to obtain minimum mean squared error estimatesx k|k = E[x k |y 0:k ] andx k+1|k = E[x k+1 |y 0:k ]. We assume that the system has been running for a long time (i.e. since k = −∞) so that the Kalman filter has converged to a fixed gain linear estimator.
B. Attack Model
We consider an adversary who is able to perform integrity attacks on a subset of actuators and sensors. Without loss of generality (WLOG) an attack begins at time 0.
When inserting B a u a k , u a k ∈ R p , the attacker has the option of modifying the defender's actuators or inserting his/her own. WLOG, B a has full column rank. Additionally, assuming an adversary modifies a set of sensors {s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s m }, we can define D a ∈ R m×m entrywise as D a uv = 1 u=si,v=i . When performing an integrity attack, we assume the adversary's goal is to adversely affect the system without being detected. Such a policy allows an attacker to affect a system for long periods of time without defender interference.
Remark 1: One may consider authenticated encryption to detect integrity attacks; however, this technique fails to detect physical attacks. Physical attacks can violate security while bypassing countermeasures from cyber security. For instance, the secrecy, integrity, and availability of measurements from a temperature sensor can be violated by adding an additional unencrypted sensor, locally heating the sensor, and placing a metal cover over the sensor, respectively.
We assume the defender knows the system model M = {A, B, C, Q, R,x 0|−1 } as well as the input and output histories given by u −∞:k and y −∞:k . However, the defender is in general unaware of the parameters of the attack model including B a , D a , u a 0:k−1 , and d a 0:k . We assume the defender performs passive detection to detect adversaries. In passive detection, the defender constructs algorithms which leverage his/her information I k to make a decision about the system: if it is operating normally H 0 or under attack H 1 . In a threshold based detector, this can be formulated as g(I k ) H1 ≷ H0 η k . As an example, the defender could construct residue detectors based on the parameter z k , which characterize the difference between observed and expected behavior. Under normal operation, z k has IID Gaussian distribution
Here, the probability of detection β k and the probability of false alarm α k are given by
While passive detection is often effective against benign faults, powerful adversaries can damage a CPS if passive detection is used alone. We next examine such scenarios.
III. STEALTHY ATTACK SCENARIOS
We now examine stealthy attacks against passive detectors.
A. Replay Attack
In [7] , [12] [13] [14] , a replay attack is considered. Here, the adversary has the ability to read and modify all sensor outputs. The adversary performs the following: 1) (s)he records a long sequence of outputs y 0:T .
2) Starting at time T , (s)he replaces y k with y k−T . Thus,
3) The attacker adds some harmful input B a u a k . Under certain control policies, replay attacks are asymptotically stealthy so that lim k→∞ β k − α k = 0, see Theorem 3 [13] . For instance, if the defender uses state feedback, u k = Lx k|k , a replay attack is stealthy if A (A + BL)(I − KC) is Schur stable. Additionally, if u k = h(y k ) for some function h, a replay attack is also stealthy. As an example, the Stuxnet malware [15] in part used a replay attack to hide attacks on centrifuges in uranium enrichment plants in Iran.
B. Model Aware Adversaries
Knowledge of the system model can be a powerful tool for adversaries, allowing them to construct stealthy attack sequences. Dynamics may be well known from first principles or available to malicious insiders. In this section, we will briefly revisit zero dynamics attacks and stealthy false data injection attacks. In a zero dynamics attack [8] , the nonzero attack inputs {u a k }, {d a k } satisfy the following equation
for some x 0 ∈ R n . A nontrivial zero dynamics attack exists as long as A, B a , C, D a is not strongly observable [16] . Here, x 0 must belong to the weakly unobservable subspace V(A, B a , C, D a ). V ⊂ R n can be described as the largest subspace [16] for which there are maps F 1 and F 2 satisfying
A feasible attack sequence is to select x 0 ∈ V and have
(10) A zero dynamics attack is stealthy when the defender has no knowledge of x 0 [8] . Even when the defender has uncertain knowledge, the attack leads to vanishing bias on the residues z k . In particular let z n k be the residue under normal operation and assume the system is under attack. The residue's bias is given by ∆z k z k − z n k . We have the following result, with proof omitted due to spacing.
Theorem 2: Under a zero dynamics attack,
is stable and thus ∆z k converges to 0. It can be easily seen that in a χ 2 detector, lim k→∞ β k − α k = 0. More generally, smaller magnitudes of ∆z k result in poor detection performance. In fact we have the following result from [17] .
The converse also holds if y k is ergodic. Motivated by the relationship of residue biases to detection performance, Mo et al. in [18] and [19] examine stealthy false data injection attacks and integrity attacks where ∆z
The authors investigate the perturbations an adversary can introduce to the state while remaining stealthy.
IV. ACTIVE DETECTION: WATERMARKING
Previously, we observed that some stealthy attacks can not be detected passively. In this section, we consider active detection using physical watermarking to expose adversaries.
A. Motivation from Cyber Security: Nonces
Let us consider the Needham Schroeder protocol [20] , which establishes a session key between 2 users, Alice A and Bob B, by leveraging access to a trusted third party, server S. In this protocol, Alice shares a session key K AB with Bob by sending {K AB , A} K BS where K BS is Bob's shared key with S and {} K * denotes encryption with key K * . This message is vulnerable to a replay attack. For instance, suppose Eve E recovers an old session key K * AB . She can replay the message {K * AB , A} K BS to Bob. Bob now believes he shares key K * AB with Alice, when he truly shares a key with Eve. This lets Eve engage in a man in the middle attack.
To counter this attack, Alice receives a nonce or random number, N B , from Bob encrypted with K BS . After communicating with S, Alice sends {K AB , A, N B } K BS to Bob. The random nonce serves as a challenge to Alice. By including the encrypted nonce in her response to Bob, Alice proves that the message is fresh, and has not been replayed.
B. Physical Watermarking
Motivated by the use of nonces in cyber security, we propose watermarking to detect replay attacks in control systems. A physical watermark, ∆u k , is a secret noisy control input inserted on top of the optimal control input u * k to authenticate the system. In particular, u k is given by
Here, the adversary can not read the defender's control input u k and does not know real time watermarks. Physical watermarking was first introduced in [7] as an IID additive input ∆u k ∼ N (0, W). Extensions have been examined in [12] [13] [14] , [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] . We consider a stationary Gaussian watermark generated by a hidden Markov model [14] below:
where A h is Schur stable with spectral radius less than or equal to a user defined constant ρ. As the watermarks are 0 mean with bounded covariance, the closed-loop system remains stable. The watermarks act as a cyber-physical nonce. Under normal conditions, the watermark will be embedded in the sensor outputs due to the system dynamics, a valid response to this challenge. However, under replay attack, the measurements contain physical responses to an earlier sequence of watermarks. Unable to detect recent watermarks in the sensor outputs, the defender can not verify freshness.
To perform detection, the defender can exploit the difference in distributions of the residue z k under attack and normal operation. For instance, if u *
where
and Σ is a linear increasing (in the semidefinite sense) function of the watermark covariance in the IID case, and a linear increasing function of the autocovariances in the stationary case, see [14] . A χ 2 or Neyman Pearson detector can be used. Alternatively, a correlator detector [13] can be considered. Here, the defender computes an output y * k by running a simulated version of the system with the same chosen watermarks, and then calculates g(I k ) = −y T k y * k . Under replay attack, y k and y * k have no correlation because they are generated by different independent watermarks. However, under normal operation, a positive correlation between y k and y * k exists. The correlation detector can distinguish between faulty scenarios and malicious attacks [12] . Additional asymptotic detectors (with finite statistical approximations) that guarantee zero average distortion power in sensors are proposed in [24] , [25] .
When deviating from an optimal strategy, performance loss must be weighed. We can use the degrees of freedom in our watermark, the (auto)covariance functions, to balance trade-offs between detection and control. While increasing the size of the covariance improves security, watermarks with larger magnitudes decay control. Semidefinite programs have been proposed in both [13] and [14] to address this trade-off. For instance, the authors in [13] maximize the expected bias inserted into the χ 2 detector subject to an upper bound on additional linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) costs due to watermarking. Watermarking can be effective in other scenarios. Under certain attack strategies, watermarking can detect adversaries who know the system model [22] and attackers who attempt to learn the model [26] , [27] .
We test physical watermarking on the quadruple tank process, a four state system [28] . The goal is to control the water level of two of four tanks using two pumps. Two sensors measure water heights. We use an LQG controller with weights following suggestions in [29] . Q and R are created by generating a matrix from a uniform distribution, multiplying it by its transpose, and dividing by 100. A stationary Gaussian watermark [14] (ρ = 0.5) is inserted. Experiments were averaged over 1000 trials.
In Fig. 1 we examine security and performance trade-offs through relationships between the probability of false alarm, the probability of detection, and the percent increase in LQG cost due to watermarking. A χ 2 detector with window size 10 is implemented for detection. In Fig. 1a , we plot ROC curves at different additional LQG costs. In Fig. 1b , we plot the probability of detection as a function of the additional LQG cost for different fixed false alarm probabilities. In Fig.  2 , we plot our χ 2 detection statistic (window size 10) during a replay attack for a system without watermarking (Fig. 2a ) and a system with watermarking (Fig. 2b) . Replay attacks commence at time 10 sec. The probability of false alarm in Fig. 2 is 0.05 and the LQG cost is increased by 30%. V. ACTIVE DETECTION: MOVING TARGET Watermarking detection unfortunately fails against model aware zero dynamics attacks and false data injection attacks where the bias on residues ∆z k are independent of the defender's inputs. Accordingly, we investigate a new approach.
A. Motivation from Cyber Security: MACs
In cyber security, message authentication codes or MACs can verify the integrity of a message. Suppose Alice sends message m to Bob. Eve can modify the contents of the message before forwarding it to Bob, leaving Bob unable to verify the integrity of m. To prevent this, Alice appends a MAC f K AB (m) to the message m. Here, K AB is a shared secret key between Alice and Bob and f K AB (m) is a keyed pseudo-random function of the message. Upon receiving m, Bob computes f K AB (m). Under normal operation, the MACs Bob receives and computes are identical. Alternatively, if Eve modifies m to m , she will likely be unable to compute a valid f K AB (m ) unless she knows K AB or replays a previous message. A replay attack can be prevented by including a timestamp in m, while K AB is only shared between Alice and Bob. Thus, the MAC assures message integrity.
B. Moving Target
We now introduce the moving target approach, first examined in [11] . Here, an authenticating subsystem with time varying dynamics is introduced on top of the original system:
Moreover, we introduce additional sensorsỹ k ∈ Rm to measure the extraneous states,
We assume that the process and sensor noise is IID with
The system matrices are assumed to be IID variables which are independent of the sensor and process noise with distribution
The sequence of time varying system matrices is determined by a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG), the seed of which is known by the defender, but hidden from the adversary. We consider an attacker who knows (A, B, C, Q, R) and has the ability to read and modify all inputs and outputs u 0:k , y 0:k ,ỹ 0:k .ỹ k acts as a cyber-physical MAC, preventing the adversary from constructing a stealthy integrity attack. In particular, suppose the message m corresponds to outputs y k while the MAC isỹ k . The MACỹ k is correlated to the message y k through the state x k−1 and the input u k−1 . The key is the seed which determines the sequence of system matrices. The defender uses knowledge of y k and the sequence of system matrices to estimateỹ k . Under normal operation,ỹ k and its estimateŷ k closely agree, as seen by a residue based detector, and as a result the MAC is verified.
However, suppose an adversary performs integrity attacks using knowledge of (A, B, C, Q, R). The attacker could generate convincing outputs y k , while biasing the states x k through a false data injection or zero dynamics attack. At the same time, (s)he will also bias the statesx k and thus the MAC outputsỹ k if the time varying matrices are properly chosen. Having no knowledge of the seed, the adversary can not know the time varying matrices. Moreover, the time varying dynamics act as a moving target, hindering system identification. As a result, the attacker can not generate a convincing cyber-physical MAC outputỹ k . Bounds characterizing how well an adversary can construct outputs y k and y k to fool residue detectors are obtained in [11, Theorem 3] .
We apply the moving target to the quadruple tank process. 4 extra states and 2 extra outputs are added. The time varying matrices A 1,k , A 2,k , B k , C k+1 are somewhat sparse (50% of entries nonzero). The non-zero elements follow a multivariate Gaussian distribution with means generated from U (−0.5, 0.5). The covariances of the nonzero parameters are created by generating a matrix from a uniform distribution, multiplying it by its transpose, and dividing by 100.
We consider an adversary who, starting at time 200 sec, adds a constant input (in Volts) to the optimal LQG input and avoids detection by trying to subtract his own influence [11] from the measurements. First, in Figs. 3a, 4a , we assume the attacker knows the time varying system matrices. Secondly, we assume the attacker does not know the realization of A 1,k , A 2,k , B k , C k+1 , but instead performs his attack by sampling the matrices from (19) , (Figs 3b, 4b) . We plot the χ 2 detector statistic (window 10, α = 10 −7 ) in Fig. 3 and system performance in Fig. 4 , both averaged over 1000 trials.
Given full knowledge of the system matrices, the attacker can significantly affect water levels while remaining perfectly stealthy. However, with stochastic knowledge of the system matrices, the attack is easily revealed, even for small system perturbations and small α. In practice, the attack can be improved by using the measurementsỹ k to perform system identification. We expect improvements to be marginal since the system changes at each time step. As a result, characterizing the effectiveness of an attacker who performs machine learning in a scenario where the moving target changes at a lower frequency is an immediate goal. The theory of estimation with stochastically varying parameters [30] might also be useful for developing stronger attack strategies. 
C. Alternative Formulation of Moving Target
Consider the scenario where the plant is modeled as a hybrid system which transitions across multiple modes:
We assume that (A k , C k ) belongs to some finite set Γ {(A(1), C(1)), · · · , (A(l), C(l))}. This alternative moving target formulation was considered in [31] . Here, the system periodically and randomly transitions across modes in Γ, for instance according to an aperiodic and irreducible Markov Chain. The authors consider how this moving target could be used to identify sensor attacks from an adversary whose attack inputs do not leverage knowledge of the prior inputs/outputs. In this case, the goal is not only to detect sensor attacks, but to determine which sensors have been corrupted. Prior results in deterministic scenarios state that a system must remain observable after removing any 2q sensors to identify q sensor attacks [3] . Weerakkody et al. argue [31] that a moving target approach increases the number of sensors that can be identified. Design recommendations are made which guarantee the perfect identifiability of all sensor attacks in deterministic systems. Additionally, in stochastic systems, the authors show they can construct robust fusion based estimators and detectors, which identify sensors that are subject to destabilizing integrity attacks.
VI. CONSIDERATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this section, we discuss next steps towards implementing physical watermarking and the moving target.
A. Physical Watermarking
In physical watermarking, previous work [13] , [14] , [22] , addressed trade-offs between detection and control performance by solving semidefinite programs to obtain watermark (auto)covariances. These semidefinite programs attempt to maximize a statistic related to detection, subject to a constraint on LQG cost. In practice, however, LQG controllers may not be used. Ideally, system designers will formulate convex constraints and objectives, which adequately summarize necessary system goals for different controllers. Alternatively, designers can formulate LQG constraints which best capture performance requirements and perform simulations to verify proper behavior. We must also account for a system's nonlinearity. A watermark should never be so large that it takes a system out of the region of operation.
Designers must consider the composition of watermarks with other security primitives. To implement watermarking effectively, a nonempty subset of the actuators must deliver control inputs which are kept secret from the adversary [22] . For instance, knowledge of the input can be used to completely break security if a model aware adversary uses this information to generate virtual outputs by simulation. The secrecy of control inputs can be preserved for instance through encryption. Actuators typically have more computational resources than sensors, allowing them to implement cryptographical primitives. Prior work assumes that watermarks are generated by true random number generators. In practice, we are restricted to PRNGs. Thus, the selection of cryptographically secure PRNGs must be done carefully.
As an example, suppose an IID Gaussian watermark is generated by: 1) A linear congruential generator which evolves according to X n+1 = (aX n +c) mod M , 0 ≤ a, c, ≤ M . Here, Xn M approximates a uniform random variable, 2) The Box-Muller transform which converts a uniform random variable to a Gaussian random variable, 3) A linear transformation to obtain a watermark of the appropriate covariance. A malicious insider with model knowledge, and some prior input and output history, can learn the secret key of the PRNG (a, c, M ) as follows. 1) Run a linear filter using the input/output history to estimate prior watermarks. The convergence to the true watermarks is exponential. 2) Take the inverse of the linear and Box-Muller transformations to obtain the sequence of uniform random variables. 3) Intelligently search over space of M (as low as 2 32 possible values), and algebraically solve for a and c. If the key is not changed, the attacker can predict all future watermarks.
We recommend the examination of alternative watermarking designs. In principle, there is no need to restrict watermarks to be Gaussian or stationary. For example, results in [23] suggest that Gaussian watermarks could be optimal against Gaussian attackers. See also [27] for non-stationary and non-Gaussian watermark designs. In our current work, we are evaluating the effectiveness of a watermark obtained by dropping the control input randomly according to IID Bernoulli and Markovian strategies in combination with a Gaussian additive input. From an application perspective, implementations are necessary to validate watermark designs. Ko et al. [32] have examined watermarking in vehicular systems while Rubio-Hernan et al. [27] have experimented on a SCADA testbed. We are investigating watermark implementations with quadrotors and plan testing on a smart grid testbed.
B. Moving Target
Developing a mechanism for generating time varying dynamics is important in the moving target. It will be ideal to leverage the dynamics that already exist in a system, (e.g. the heat released by a reaction or the frictional signatures of mechanical components). Alternatively, we can introduce physical hardware to generate the authenticating subsystem. When devoting resources to develop new hardware, economic costs must be balanced with potential benefits of security against powerful attacks.
We envision that a moving target device could contain simple circuits which take a portion of the state as an input and emitỹ k as the output. We can affix such a device to system components (e.g an electric generator or reactor). The time varying behavior can be implemented by using adaptive components in the circuit, for instance variable capacitors and resistors. Such a device would likely also contain a PRNG whose output would determine real time resistances and capacitances and whose seed is known to the defender. In the alternative moving target, we assume that there exist sufficiently many degrees of freedom in the plant, allowing the defender to periodically transfer across modes of operation as determined by a PRNG.
The integration of the moving target with other security primitives has to be investigated. The root of the trust is the seed of our PRNG. Thus, it is desirable to use a cryptographically secure PRNG. Additionally, a secure key sharing protocol [33] must be used to ensure both the plant and operator agree on the secret seed so that the defender can perform proper estimation and detection.
We should consider trade-offs between detection and control performance when implementing the moving target. In [11] , it is assumed that the defender does not care about controllingx k . If this assumption is true, then we can utilize optimal control inputs u * k derived from y 0:k and avoid a loss in performance. Such a design also prevents a control input from leaking information about the time varying system dynamics. However, this assumption should be rigorously verified in practice. The alternative moving target, as a consequence of unplanned transitions, likely does not obtain peak control performance. Theoretical and practical studies must be performed to understand the trade-offs.
Further theoretical developments are also needed. In the original moving target, it is important to examine the properties of the time varying matrices A 1,k , A 2,k , B k , C k+1 . Some matrix parameters may not be time varying and are possibly 0. For instance C k can be constant and B k can be 0, without eliminating the advantages of the moving target. Likewise, system transitions need not be at every time step, but can instead occur after a realistic period (accounting for system inertia) that still hampers an attacker's system identification. Moreover, in practice, time varying parameters in a moving target will be sampled from a discrete (though possibly quite rich) distribution. Nonlinear designs of a moving target should also be investigated.
A number of necessary conditions for the design of system matrices can be obtained. For instance, the original states x k should be observable from the sensorsỹ k Additionally, given partial channel access for the attacker, the zero dynamics in the nominal system should not remain as zero dynamics when the authenticating subsystem is added.
While ample design suggestions have been provided for the alternative moving target [31] , the attack model is limiting. In particular, it is assumed that the attacker does not leverage channel information. In a stochastic scenario, it would be worthwhile to examine what guarantees can be provided when measurements and control inputs are public and used by the adversary.
Ample testing is also required in the moving target. We wish to perform simulations to investigate the bounds characterizing how well an adversary can construct outputs y k andỹ k to fool residue based detectors (Theorem 3, [11] ).
We also plan to determine effective attack strategies which utilize system identification. Once we identify an application and build suitable hardware for generating the moving target dynamics, a testing phase could commence.
The development of a unified approach to detection is a clear goal. A defender is not restricted to use only one of these strategies, especially since the proposed approaches vary in terms of their effectiveness for detecting specific attacks. In this respect, it is important to identify an adversarial model which characterizes the resources and knowledge an operator anticipates an attacker could procure. From here, the defender can choose defenses to expose feasible attack strategies. For instance, if the system model is unknown and the inputs are private, a defender may determine that physical watermarking is effective on its own. Alternatively, against stronger adversaries, the moving target and physical watermarking can be strategically combined to detect attacks while limiting costs and performance loss to the system. Another direction to investigate is a game theoretic formulation of the attack detection problem [21] where an attacker wishes to maximize performance loss while ensuring stealthiness, while the defender wishes to limit the impact of a stealthy attacker through active strategies. Analyzing potential equilibria can illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed approaches against strategic, intelligent adversaries.
